The Allahabad High Court quashed the rejection of a woman’s claim for compassionate appointment on the ground that she was a married daughter, holding that marital status cannot be a disqualification in the face of a judgment declaring such exclusion unconstitutional.
The court also rejected the authorities’ objection that her claim was time-barred, observing, “To permit the respondents to take advantage of the time consumed in their own administrative process would amount to converting an administrative delay into a disqualification against the claimant. Such an approach would be manifestly inequitable and legally unsustainable.”
The single bench of Justice Manju Rani Chauhan passed the order on a petition filed by Manisha Tyagi, challenging the November 14, 2024, order of the District Basic Education Officer, Saharanpur, which rejected her claim for compassionate appointment following the death of her father, Dharamveer Singh, an assistant teacher in a primary school.
The petitioner’s father died in harness on May 14, 2015. She applied for a compassionate appointment on May 17, 2016, but the authorities rejected her claim on September 5, 2016, citing her marital status and lack of the prescribed qualifications for appointment as an assistant teacher.
She challenged the decision before the High Court in 2019. Further, on May 10, 2024, the court set aside the rejection order.
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In the said order, the court directed the District Basic Education Officer to reconsider her claim in light of the law laid down in Neha Srivastava v. State of U.P., but the authority rejected her claim again on November 14, 2024.
The petitioner then approached the High Court a second time.
Her counsel argued that the exclusion of married daughters from the definition of “family” under the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependants of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974, had already been struck down by a Division Bench of the High Court in Vimla Srivastava v. State of U.P.
The aforesaid judgment, delivered on December 4, 2015, held that excluding married daughters merely because of their marital status violated Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The word “unmarried” in Rule 2(c)(iii) was consequently struck down.
The State Government subsequently issued a notification on November 12, 2021, removing the word “unmarried” from the Rules 2(c)(iii) of the Dying in Harness Rules, 1974.
The counsel for the petitioner contended that the subsequent notification did not mean that the benefit of the earlier judgment could be denied to her.
She relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Government of India And Another vs. Sri Devaraj URS Medical College, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1479, and Sayara Khatoon @ Shayara Khatoon and another v. State of Bihar and others, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1466, and argued that a declaration of law ordinarily applies retrospectively unless the court expressly restricts its operation to the future.
The State opposed the petition by arguing that the application was beyond the prescribed period. Relying on Clause 8 of the Government Order dated September 4, 2000, the respondents submitted that an application for compassionate appointment had to be considered within five years of the employee’s death.
They also contended that the notification removing the restriction on married daughters had been issued after her claim was rejected.
The High Court found no merit in either ground for rejecting the claim.
It held that the decision in Vimla Srivastava had already settled the legal position and that the State Government’s subsequent notification brought the Rules in line with that judgment.
The court observed that the petitioner’s claim could not be rejected by treating her marital status as an insurmountable disqualification.
It further held that the subsequent amendment did not create a new right for married daughters but brought the statutory framework into conformity with the constitutional position already declared by the court.
On the question of limitation, the bench noted that the petitioner had applied on May 17, 2016, and her claim had initially been rejected because she was a married daughter.
The court ruled that,
“Thus, it cannot legitimately be said that the petitioner slept over her claim or approached the competent authority after an unexplained or inordinate delay.”
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The court held that the relevant consideration was whether the claimant had approached the competent authority within the prescribed period.
The date of the subsequent rejection could not be used retrospectively to determine whether the original application was delayed. It found no basis to treat the petitioner’s application as belated.
The bench held that the November 14, 2024, order could not stand in law; the court quashed it and sent the matter back to the District Basic Education Officer, Saharanpur, for fresh consideration under the 1974 Rules and the law laid down in Vimla Srivastava, read with the subsequent judicial pronouncements.
The authority has been directed to examine the petitioner’s claim without being influenced by her marital status.
It must consider the other relevant conditions, including her dependency, the family’s financial condition, the qualifications she possessed when she applied in May 2016, the availability of a suitable post and other applicable requirements.
The court made it clear that quashing the rejection order did not give the petitioner an automatic right to appointment.
Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed to this extent.
Case: Manisha Tyagi vs State of U.P. and 2 others
Case No.: Writ A No. – 1685 of 2025
Date of Order: 16.10.2026
Status: Allowed
Order: Click here for download
